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Abstract 
We develop a theoretical model to identify conditions under which price and income changes are most 
likely to change weight. Although it is intuitive that raising the price of high-calorie food will decrease 
consumption of such goods; it is not clear that such an outcome will actually reduce weight. Our empirical 
analysis demonstrates a case where a tax on food away from home, a food intake category blamed for much 
of the rise in obesity, could lead to an increase in body weight; a ﬁnding which emphasizes the need to 
employ economic modeling when developing public policy to reduce obesity. 
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1. Introduction 
American eating habits have contributed to high obesity rates – the highest in the world. Previ­
ous studies have suggested that agricultural policies combined with the switch from individual to 
mass food preparation have reduced the price of energy consumption (Critsler, 2004; Drenowski, 
2003; Pollan, 2003). Others have argued that technological change has decreased real food prices 
while simultaneously increasing the price of burning calories as people’s work is now more 
 sedentary (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Philipson and Posner, 1999). Although the calories 
expended have remained relatively constant since the 1980’s, people now consume many more 
calories (Cutler et al., 2003). The result has been an energy imbalance that manifests itself in 
higher weight. 
The growing obesity epidemic, and the economic externalities it spawns, represents a public 
health problem that necessitates an exploration of public policy measures that can impact food 
consumption, physical activity, and consequently, body weight. Market interventions, such as 
taxes and subsidies may be necessary to correct market failures related to obesity. 
Externalities arise because of the increase in obesity-related cost, which society bears through 
higher taxes in order to fund Medicare and Medicaid and through higher insurance rates. Market 
interventions may also be necessary due to self-control problems or time-inconsistent preferences 
that exist from individuals deriving immediate gratiﬁcation from food consumption, while dis­
counting future health costs (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2000; Cutler et al., 2003). In addition 
to these issues, information asymmetries, which may result from a lack of knowledge about the 
health consequences of certain diets may be another motivation for market intervention (Cawley,
2003). 
2. Background 
The role of the federal government in managing obesity has thus far been limited to information 
distribution (Kuchler et al., 2005). However, several recent bills have been passed to discourage the 
consumption of unhealthy foods by increasing the effective price to consumers. Several states plan 
to impose or broaden sales taxes on soft drinks, syrups, and other food items (Uhlman, 2003). Small 
taxes could also be placed on junk food, often called a ‘fat tax’ or ‘Twinkie tax’. Some 18 states 
are using different forms of the high-calorie tax. The high-calorie tax is not only a domestic issue; 
other countries are addressing increased obesity by taxes. For example, in addition to standardizing 
labeling of fat and sugar content in processed foods, the UK is considering the introduction 
of different value added taxes for foods with poor nutritional standards (British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) News, 2004; Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2004; Kuchler et al., 2005). 
Fat taxes have provoked many opposing opinions among researchers, interest groups, politi­
cians, and the general public. Beside the idea that a high-calorie tax may lead consumers to 
switch from unhealthy food purchases to more healthful alternatives, the tax would also provide 
an important ﬁnancial incentive for food manufacturers and fast-food restaurants to revise the 
nutritional content of their foods (USA Today, 2004). According to Nestle (2002), 75% of the 
newly introduced 11,000 food products in 1998 consisted of candy, condiments, breakfast cereals, 
baked goods, beverages and dairy products (USA Today, 2004). Supporters of the high-calorie 
tax emphasize its signaling power to producers and consumers, which would show that nutritional 
content of food is important to health. 
Opponents of the high-calorie tax argue that it is regressive because the tax burden would 
fall primarily on low-income families who spend a larger portion of their income on food and 
who rely on fast food for cheap meals (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) News Online, 
2004). In contrast to the fat tax, Cash et al. (2004) argue that more progressive public policy mea­
sures would include subsidizing fruit and vegetables, often called thin subsidies, to encourage 
the consumption of healthier foods. Due to the diminishing marginal health beneﬁt of produce 
consumption, low-income consumers who typically eat fewer fruit and vegetables could be more 
responsive to small dietary changes than consumers who typically consume more fruit and veg­
etables (Cash et al., 2004; Huang and Lin, 2000). Variyam (2005) sees the disparities in obesity 
across population groups, such as different income and racial/ethnic groups, as a justiﬁcation for 

government intervention on social equity grounds. 
In addition to fat taxes and thin subsidies, a number of studies have determined that income 
has a major impact on obesity (e.g., Deaton, 2003; Drenowski, 2003; Townsend et al., 2001; 
Dietz, 1995). As compared to high-income households, low-income households in high-income 
countries tend to consume lower quality diets, consisting mainly of high-calorie foods, leading to 
problems of overweight and obesity (Drenowski, 2003; Townsend et al., 2001; The Economist, 
2002). However, recent ﬁndings suggest the prevalence of obesity has nearly tripled among higher 
income households, which has diminished the difference in obesity rates among income groups 
(Hellmich, 2005; Microsoft/National Broadcasting Corporation, 2005). These ﬁndings suggest 
that to fully understand the change in obesity over the past few decades, a better understanding 
of the effect of income on obesity is needed. 
Despite the signiﬁcant increase in U.S. obesity, economic research on obesity has only recently 
begun. Few economic studies have focused on obesity and body weight; the most notable excep­
tions are Philipson and Posner (1999), Chou et al. (2004), Cutler et al. (2003), Cash et al. (2004), 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002), Kuchler et al. (2005). Although a number of state and federal 
proposals have been put forth to curb the rise in obesity, there remains an inadequate conceptual 
foundation for determining how and when market interventions will reach their desired objec­
tives. Indeed, the need for research that evaluates whether changes in economic factors, such as 
prices and income inﬂuence body weight has been identiﬁed by a number of previous studies 
(e.g., Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). 
3. Research objectives 
In contrast to previous studies that have focused on the role of public policy on calorie con­
sumption (Drenowski, 2003; Jacobson and Brownell, 2000), the primary goal of this study is to 
identify the relationships between food prices, the price of exercise, and income on body weight. 
The framework used in this study expands on the work of Philipson and Posner (1999) and 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) who proposed entering body weight into the utility function. A 
few other studies have attempted to investigate the effect of price changes on food consumption 
or “lives saved” (e.g., Kuchler et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2004) but few have actually focused on 
weight changes. For example, Kuchler et al. (2005) utilized price elasticities to forecast the impact 
of a snack food tax on consumption, but their study did not take individual body weight impacts 
into consideration. The Law of Demand states that a price increase will result in a reduction in 
the quantity of the good consumed. However, it is not necessarily the case that weight will also 
decline when ready substitutes are available. 
This study identiﬁes the conditions under which price and income changes will result in weight 
reduction. First, a simple three-good model is considered (a high-calorie food, a low-calorie food, 
and exercise) to show the theoretical implications of three market interventions (a high-calorie 
food tax, a low-calorie food subsidy, and an income change). The approach is extended, ﬁrst 
theoretically and then empirically, to analyze the weight impacts for the N-good case. 
Given that it is rather difﬁcult to obtain good survey data that contains information about 
body weight as well as economic information, such as prices and income, this study presents 
a convenient approach to overcome these data limitations when needing to estimate the weight 
effects of policy interventions. Indeed, our model is characterized solely by price and income 
elasticities, as well as weight elasticities. Price and income elasticities are readily available in 
economic literature. We further show how to calculate weight elasticities via energy accounting. 
 Thus, the theoretical framework can be conveniently implemented to determine the impact of 
price and income changes on weight. This approach is useful in the sense that it will allow policy 
makers to determine when a tax or subsidy will be most effective and to anticipate the effect of 
income changes on weight. Furthermore, we demonstrates how the theoretical approach can be 
empirically applied using the cases of a tax on food away from home, a tax on regular soft drinks, 
a subsidy on fruit and vegetables, and a subsidy on diet soft drinks. The consequences of income 
changes on body weight are explored as well. 
4. A model of consumer behavior including weight 
This study works within a utility maximization framework, where utility is speciﬁed as a 
function of body weight which in turn is speciﬁed as a function of the quantity of foods consumed 
and exercise. To illustrate the mechanics of the model, a simple three-good example is analyzed 
ﬁrst (a high-calorie food, a low-calorie food, and exercise), later the analysis is extended to the N-
good case. Assume that an individual’s weight, W, is affected by three factors: the consumption of 
a high-calorie food (FH), a low-calorie food (FL), and exercise (E); i.e., W = W(FH, FL, E). Weight 
is strictly increasing in food intake and decreasing in exercise; i.e., ∂W/∂F > 0 and ∂W/∂E < 0.1 
As in Philipson and Posner (1999), an individual’s weight is included as an argument in the 
utility function. Overall, an individual derives utility from weight, the intake of food, exercise, 
and other consumption goods (C).2 
The utility function can be stated as 
U(W(FH, FL, E), FH, FL, E, C). (1) 
The function has the usual properties of being increasing at a decreasing rate in FH, FL, and C. 
Utility is assumed to be increasing in weight up to some ideal weight level, WI and is decreasing 
in weight levels greater than WI. This ideal weight is an individual-speciﬁc, subjective measure. 
The utility function is maximized with respect to a budget constraint that limits the amount of 
money spent on food and other consumption goods 
pFH F
H + pFL FL + pEE + pCC = I, (2) 
where p i is the price of food type i (i = H, L), pE is the price of exercise, pC is the price ofF 
all other consumption goods, and I represents income.3 The set-up is similar to that used by 
1 Whether an individual is overweight or obese is determined by the Body Mass Index (BMI), which is determined by 
the formula: weight (in kilograms)/height2 (in meters squared). Among adults, overweight is classiﬁed by a BMI between 
25.0 and 29.9, while a BMI greater than or equal to 30.0 deﬁnes obesity (CDC, 2004b; USDHHS-NCHS, 2002). 
2 The goal of our paper is to incorporate weight into a traditional economic model of the consumer so as to determine 
the effectiveness of policy interventions, such as fat taxes. It is possible that consumers have satiation points as discussed 
in Ello-Martin et al. (2005). Such satiation points are fully captured in this general speciﬁcation of the utility function. In
particular, the marginal utility describes how “satisfying” is an extra unit of consumption of a good. As described in the 
paper, the utility function is assumed to be increasing at a decreasing rate in food consumption. This means the marginal 
utility of food consumption, while positive, is decreasing. Whether a person is “satiated” in our model depends on the 
marginal utility for that good. Ultimately, food prices and income determine the level of each food consumed, and thus 
the marginal utilities. Thus, to the extent that satiation points exist (i.e., marginal utilities are close to zero), this is fully 
reﬂected in the own- and cross-price elasticities, which are derived from the maximization of the utility function given a 
budget constraint and food prices and income. 
3 Given that an individual trades an hour of labor for leisure-time activities, such as exercise, there is a price associated 
with exercise. 
Philipson and Posner (1999). The key departure from that study is the inclusion of multiple foods, 
which as shown in subsequent analyses has important implications for the efﬁcacy of a tax or 
subsidy. 
Individuals maximize Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint given in Eq. (2). Solving the ﬁrst 
order conditions yields the optimal levels of both food types, exercise, other consumption goods, 
and body weight, which depend on the prices of all goods and income. The optimal weight W* 
can be expressed as 
∗ W = W ∗(F H∗(pFH , pFL , pC, pE, I), F  L∗(pF H , pF L , pC, pE, I), 
E ∗(pF H , pFL , pC, pE, I)), (3) 
where the * superscript indicates utility maximizing levels. At this point, it is important to rec­
ognize that economically optimal weight, W*, that results from the utility maximization decision 
does not necessarily coincide with the ideal weight WI or even weight that is optimal for the health 
of the individual. For example, low food prices may lead individuals to gain weight beyond WI 
because the utility of lower-priced food consumption outweighs the disutility of being overweight 
relative to an individual’s ideal. 
Now, to determine the impact of a change in the price of a high-calorie food, such as that 
which would occur through the imposition of an ad valorem high-calorie food tax, it is necessary 
to differentiate (3) with respect to (w.r.t.) the high-calorie food price pF H, which yields 
∂W ∗ ∂W ∗ ∂F H∗ ∂W ∗ ∂F L∗ ∂W ∗ ∂E ∗ = + + . (4)
∂pFH ∂F
H∗ ∂pFH ∂F L∗ ∂pFL ∂E∗ ∂pFL 
After a bit of algebra, Eq. (4) can be converted to the ﬁrst key elasticity equation as shown below 
εW ∗ p
F H 
= εW∗F H∗ εHH + εW∗FL∗ εHL + εW ∗ E ∗ εEH, (5) 
where εW∗ p
F H 
is the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% change in pFH. This 
weight change is inﬂuenced by εHH, which is the own-price elasticity of demand for the high-
calorie food and εLH and εEH, which are cross-price elasticities associated with the percentage 
change in consumption in low-calorie food and exercise resulting from a 1% change in the price of 
high-calorie food, respectively. The percentage change in weight associated with a 1% change in 
high-calorie food is also inﬂuenced by εW∗F H∗ , the percentage change in weight resulting from a 
1% change in food type i and εW∗E∗ , the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% change 
in exercise. The sign of εW∗ p
F H 
depends on whether FL* and E* are substitutes or complements 
for FH* and the degree to which changes in food consumption and exercise change weight. The 
signs of the elasticity will be discussed in detail later. 
In a similar fashion to that shown above, one can derive the weight change resulting from a 
change in the low-calorie food (e.g., a low-calorie subsidy) or income. The elasticity equation 
resulting from a change in the price of the low-calorie food is equivalent to that in Eq. (5) with 
the superscripts H and L reversed on the food types and prices. Regarding income changes, the 
optimal weight Eq. (3) can be differentiated w.r.t. income to generate the second key elasticity 
equation, 
εW ∗I = εW ∗ FH∗ εHI + εW ∗ FL∗ εLI + εW ∗ E ∗ εEI, (6) 
where εW∗I is the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% change in income, εHI, εLI 
and εEI are income elasticities of high-calorie food, low-calorie food and exercise, respectively, 
 ∑ 
∑ ∑ 
∑ 
( ) ∑ 
εW∗Fi∗ is the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% change in food type i and εW ∗ E ∗ 
is the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% change in exercise. 
Now that the basic model has been outlined, it should be clear that the elasticity equations can 
be easily extended to any N-good case. If an individual consumes N food types and exercise, Eq. 
(5) generalizes to 
N−1 
εW ∗ p
FH∗ = εW ∗ FH∗ εHH + εW ∗ FLi∗ εLiH + εW ∗ E ∗ εEH (7) 
i=1 
and Eq. (6) generalizes to 
N−1 N−1 
εW∗I = εW∗FLi∗ εILi + εW∗FHi∗ εIHi + εW∗E∗ εEI. (8) 
i=1 i=1 
Furthermore, the case where a tax or subsidy is applied to one good can be extended to the N-good 
case, such that high-calorie taxes are applied to i high-calorie foods, denoted by FHi*, or subsidies 
are applied to n low-calorie foods, FLn*. In order to determine the weight change resulting from 
a change in the prices of multiple high-calorie FHi* and low-calorie foods FLn*, it is necessary 
to take the total differential of the optimal weight equation W* with the respective prices pFHi 
and pFLn . For the example of an ad valorem tax on multiple high-calorie goods, W* is totally 
differentiated w.r.t pFH1 through pFHi , which can be converted to the third key elasticity equation 
ˆ 
∗ W = pˆ FH1 (εW∗FH1∗ εH1H1 + . . . + εW ∗ FHi∗ εHiH1 + εW∗FL1∗ εL1H1 + . . .  
+ εW∗FLn ∗ εLnH1 + εW∗E∗ εEH1) + . . . pˆ FHi (εW ∗ FH1∗ εH1Hi + . . .  
+ εW ∗ FHi∗ εHiHi + εW∗FL1∗ εL1H1 + . . . + εW ∗ FLn ∗ εLnHi + εW ∗ E ∗ εEHi) (9) 
ˆ ∗where W is the percentage change in weight and pˆ is the percentage change in price. For the 
example of applying a 1% tax on multiple high-calorie foods, FHi*, then pˆFH1 through pˆFHi = 1. If 
the tax is only applied to one high-calorie food, FH1∗, then pˆFH1 = 1 and pˆFH2 through pˆFHi = 0, 
which results in Eq. (5). 
4.1. Efﬁcacy of a tax on high-calorie foods 
Eq. (7) is used to determine the signs and magnitudes of the elasticities necessary to cause 
a decline in body weight. The policy objective is to reduce weight so it is desirable that the 
price-weight elasticity εWpH is negative (note: in subsequent discussion the superscript * has been 
dropped for notational convenience). In order for an increase in high-calorie food price to generate 
a weight reduction, the following relationship needs to hold 
N−1 
0 > εWFH εHH + εWFLi εLiH + εWEεHE. (10) 
i=1 
Rearranging (10) yields 
N−1 

i=1 εWFLi εLiH + εWEεHE
− > εHH. (11)
εWFH 
( ) 
∑ 
∑ 
It is known that εWF H > εWFL because the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% 
change in high-calorie food is always greater than the percentage change in weight resulting 
N−1from a 1% change in lower-calorie food. It is also known that εWF H , εWFL , and >i=2 εWF Li 
0 and εWE < 0. However, in the multiple good case, it is not known whether the numerator or 
the denominator of the left hand side of (11) is larger and thus, whether the magnitude of this 
ratio would be less than or greater than εHH. In order to obtain more speciﬁc ideas regarding the 
signs of the parameters, Eq. (11) could be simpliﬁed to the case of only two goods, for example 
high- and low-calorie foods, in which case it becomes 
εWFL 
εLH < |εHH|. (12)
εWFH 
Given that εWFH > εWFL , it is known that the ratio (εWF L /εWF H) is less than one. In order to 
decide under what conditions the inequality in (12) holds, it is necessary to determine whether 
high- and low-calorie foods are substitutes or complements. 
When high- and low-calorie foods are complements, εLH < 0, the left hand side of (12) will 
be negative; i.e., weight is ensured to decline when a tax is placed on a high-calorie good with a 
close compliment. An example for this case would be taxing high-calorie salad dressing, which 
would decrease the consumption of both dressing and salad. Thus, with both the left hand side 
being negative and the right hand side being positive, the inequality in (12) will always hold. 
The case of substitutability between high- and low-calorie foods, εLH > 0, is slightly more 
complicated. For values of (εWF L /εWFH) close to zero, which would result from a very small 
magnitude of εWFL or a large magnitude of εWF H, weight is almost certain to decline for any 
value of εLH. On the other hand, if (εWF L /εWF H ) is close to one and the substitution between 
high and low-calorie foods is strong relative to the own-price effect (e.g., εLH > |εHH|), a tax on 
high-calorie food will actually increase weight. The extent to which there are strong substitutes 
available, εLH ≈ |εHH|, which are of similar caloric composition to the high-calorie food, the less 
effective a high-calorie tax. Consider a couple of examples. First, consider a tax placed on all 
caloric soft drinks. Because soft drinks have a readily available substitute, e.g., diet soft drinks, 
one might be tempted to conclude this tax will not reduce weight; however, recognizing that diet 
soft drinks contribute no calories; i.e., εWF L = 0, it should be clear that weight will decline (at 
least in this two-good example) as the left hand side of Eq. (12) would be zero. As a counter 
example, consider a tax on donuts, but not cinnamon rolls. In this case, (εWFL /εWFH) would be 
close to one and the large degree of substitutability would imply little or no reduction in weight. 
4.2. Relative effectiveness of a tax on high-calorie food versus a subsidy on low-calorie food 
Rather than taxing high-calorie foods, one might be interested in subsidizing low-calorie foods; 
however, it is at present unclear which strategy might be more effective at reducing weight. For 
the case of subsidizing low-calorie foods, the optimal weight equation W* in (3) is differentiated 
w.r.t. the price of low-calorie food pL , which leads to the elasticity equation 
εWpF L = εWF H εHL + εWFL εLL + εWEεEL (13) 
in the three-good case and 
N−1 
εWpF L = εWF Hi εHLi + εWF L εLL + εWEεEL, where i = {1, . . . , N  − 1} (14) 
i=1 
[ ] 
∑ ∑ 
∑ ∑ 
∑
in the N-good case, where N is the low-calorie good. In order for a subsidy on low-calorie food 
to reduce weight (e.g., a negative price-weight elasticity), the following inequality must hold 
N−1 

i=1 εWF Hi εHLi + εWEεEL
− < |εLL|. (15)
εWFL 
Given that the magnitudes of the numerator and denominator are unknown in general, (15) can 
be reformulated to the more speciﬁc case of just two goods 
εWFH 
εHL < |εLL|. (16)
εWFL 
In order to determine the conditions under which a high-calorie food tax of equal percentage 
value would have a greater impact on body weight than a low-calorie food subsidy, one should 
determine when εWp > εWp . Using (12) and (16), we can see that the following inequality 
F H F L 
must hold for a high-calorie tax to reduce weight by more than a thin subsidy 
εWF H(εHL − εHH) − εWFL (εLH + εLL) > 0. (17) 
It is known that εWF H > εWFL and that both are strictly positive, while the own-price elasticities 
are strictly negative. In order for the high-calorie tax to have a greater impact than the thin subsidy, 
the ﬁrst part of the left hand side needs to be a larger positive value than the second part of the 
left hand side, such that the total sum of the left hand side is greater than the value on the right 
hand side. This can be achieved by high- and low-calorie foods being weak complements, εLH, 
εHL < 0, such that εHL > εHH. For the case of substitutability between high- and low-calorie foods, 
condition (17) can be met by εHL > εLH and εHH < εHL. The condition εHL > εLH implies that 
low-calorie food has a larger income response because the substitution effects associated with 
these cross-price effects are equal. Given that low-calorie food has a larger income elasticity, the 
resulting income effect is larger as well. 
4.3. Effect of income changes on weight 
Technological development and other factors often cause an increase in the relative income 
or purchasing power of consumers. This framework can be used to evaluate the conditions under 
which income changes result in a decline in body weight. Eq. (8) can be reformulated to the more 
general case of multiple goods, 
N−1 N−1 
εWI εWF Li εILi + εWF Hi εIHi + εWEεEI. (18) 
i=1 i=1 
In order to obtain a negative income-weight elasticity εWi, the following relationship must hold 
N−1 N−1 
0 > εWF Li εILi + εWFHi εIHi + εWEεEI. (19) 
i=1 i=1 
In the simple case of two food groups, high- and low-calorie foods, and exercise, this equation 
becomes 
0 > εWF H εHI + εWFL εLI + εWEεEI. (20) 
The homogeneity property implies 

εHI + εLI + εEI + εCI = 0 or  εEI = −εHI − εLI − εCI (21) 
Now, plugging (21) into (20) and rearranging leads to 
0 > εHI(εWFH − εWE) + εLI(εWF L − εWE) − εWEεCI (22) 
This equation shows that the effect of the income changes depends on the relative effect of 
food consumption and exercise on weight and the signs of the income elasticities of the two foods. 
Because both εWF H , εWF L > 0 and εWE < 0, the only way for the above inequality to hold is if 
one of the foods is an inferior good. Thus, an increase in income will lead to a weight gain in the 
case of normal or luxury goods. This ﬁnding is consistent with the empirical evidence showing 
an increase in obesity in the past 20 years, a time period in which real incomes have substantially 
increased.4 
5. Empirical application 
The main difﬁculty with any new ﬁeld of research is obtaining good data. Even though U.S. 
based surveys exist that collect data on BMI, these surveys are typically not linked to any economic 
factors, such as food prices, wages, income, type of employment, food consumption, prevalence 
of fast-food restaurants, etc. (Tabarrok, 2004). Fortunately, this framework provides a convenient 
manner to empirically determine the effect of price and income changes on weight. As shown 
above, the primary information needed to parameterize the model is price and income elasticities, 
which are routinely estimated by economists. The other items that need to be determined are 
the weight elasticities, which as we show in the next section, can be calculated using energy 
accounting. Because weight elasticities are less familiar to economists, the following sub-section 
delves into this issue more deeply. 
5.1. Energy accounting and weight elasticities 
Energy accounting refers to the calculation of an individual’s daily energy expenditure in terms 
of kilocalories (kcals). If energy consumed equals energy expended, no weight gain or loss occurs. 
Weight gain is associated with increased calorie consumption, holding all other factors constant. 
On average, in order to gain (lose) one pound, a person needs to consume (burn) 3500 calories in 
addition to the typical caloric intake (expenditure). Overall, a surplus (deﬁcit) of 500 kcal a day 
brings about a gain (loss) of body fat at the rate of one pound per week and a surplus (deﬁcit) of 
1000 kcal a gain (loss) of two pounds per week (Whitney et al., 2002). 
There are several approaches used in the literature to calculate energy utilization of the body. In 
this paper, we take the approach of calculating total daily energy expenditures directly by summing 
up the amount of energy spent on each activity undertaken during a day. In particular, let a day 
be divided into A total activities, where timea is the number of hours spent on individual activity 
a. Each activity is associated with an energy expenditure expressed as a metabolic equivalent 
4 In particular, for food it is likely that as income rises, the income elasticity will fall (for example, see 
this comparison of income elasticities across rich and poor countries (ERS/USDA, 2003; http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
data/InternationalFoodDemand/). This means that when income rises, weight will increase across all income groups, 
but at a faster rate for low-income individuals. 
  
 
∑ 
∑ 
( )  
(METa), which is the ratio of the work metabolic rate associated with the particular activity 
to the resting metabolic rate (Ainsworth et al., 1993). One MET is deﬁned as 1 kcal/kg/h and is 
approximately equivalent to the energy cost of sitting quietly. Thus, if an individual weighing 75 kg 
sat quietly all day for 24 h, they would expend a total of only 1800 kcal (1 kcal/kg/h × 75 kg × 24 h) 
that day. Of course, most people participate in more rigorous activities than sitting quietly all day 
and thus, total energy requirements are typically higher. In general, total energy expenditures 
(TEE) for a day are given by 
A 
TEE = W(METa)(timea). (23) 
a=1 
In steady state, energy expended equals energy consumed. Setting the total daily energy 
expenditure TEE equal to the total daily energy consumed (K) leads to 
A 
K = W(METa)(timea) (24) 
a=1 
which is an energy balance equation.5 Rearranging (24) produces 
K 
W = ∑ . (25)A 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
Differentiating Eq. (25) with respect to K yields 
∂W 1 = ∑ (26)A∂K 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
which describes the change in weight when food consumption, K, changes by 1 kcal. 
Multiplying Eq. (26) by K/W produces the calorie-weight elasticity 
∂W K 1 K 
εWK = = ∑ . (27)A∂K W 
a=1(METa)(timea) W 
The calorie-weight elasticity describes the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% 
change in caloric intake. This calorie-weight equation can be evaluated at any level of K and 
W, but one point of evaluation that is of interest is at steady state – i.e., when calories in equals 
calories out. This steady state is given by Eq. (24). If Eq. (24) is substituted for K in Eq. (27), it 
is clear that εWK = 1. Thus, so long as a person is initially in equilibrium, a 1% increase in daily 
consumption of calories will lead to a 1% increase in body weight. 
Ultimately, we are interested in calculating the food-weight elasticities εWFi shown in Eq. (5). 
This ﬁgure can be calculated by determining how average daily calorie consumption K changes 
after a 1% change in the consumption of a particular food type. In particular, the food-weight 
5 This energy balance equation explicitly assumes that the only relevant dimension of dietary quality is calorie content 
and does not take other nutritional factors into consideration. An alternative view can be found in Ludwig (2002). In 
addition, the short- and long-term effects of dietary quality may be different. Diamond (2003) points out that changing 
diet or lifestyle may precede associated health effects by as much as two decades. 
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elasticity associated with food type i, can be obtained by evaluating the following equation 
∂K F i 
εWFi = εWK (28)
∂Fi K 
where the ﬁrst term is given in Eq. (27) and the latter term in brackets, (∂K/∂Fi)(Fi/K), represents 
the percentage change in daily calorie consumption after a 1% change in the consumption of food 
type i. Fortunately, calculating (∂K/∂Fi)(Fi/K) for any particular application is quite easy: it is 
simply food i’s share of total daily calories consumed. To see this, let ki, represents the calories 
consumed from food type i in kcal/lbs. Now, total daily calorie consumed from N food types can 
Nbe expressed as K = i=1kiF i, where Fi represent the pounds of each food type consumed per 
day. Differentiating this equation with respect to the consumption of any particular food type i, 
yields ∂K/∂Fi = ki Thus, the term (∂K/∂Fi)(Fi/K) can be written as (∂K/∂Fi)(Fi/K) =  kiFi/K, which 
is simply food type i’s share of total daily energy consumption. This means that Eq. (28) simpliﬁes 
to: 
kiF
i 
εWFi = εWK . (29)
K 
In steady state, the ﬁrst term equals 1, and the food-weight elasticity can be further simpliﬁed to: 
kiF 
i 
= . (30)εWFi 
K 
The derivation of the exercise-weight elasticity needed to implement Eq. (5) follows the same 
principle as the derivation of the food-weight elasticity. In particular, let E represent the number 
of hours per day spent on exercise (i.e., E corresponds to one of the A activities in the day and can 
be denoted as timeexercise). Differentiating the energy balance equation in Eq. (25) with respect 
to E and multiplying by (E/W) yields the exercise-weight elasticity 
−K¯ (METexercise) E 
εWE = ( (31) ∑ )2 A W 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
where METexercise is the metabolic equivalent associated with exercise. 
The derivation of the energy accounting formulas for the weight elasticities in the case of 
income changes (6) follow the general steps of the outlined derivation of the weight elasticities 
Table 1 
Key elasticities in energy accounting 
Elasticity Elasticity formula Energy accounting 
Food-weight elasticity 
[ 
∂W 
∂K 
K 
W 
] 
× 
[ 
∂K 
∂Fi 
Fi 
K 
] [( 
1 ∑A 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
) ( 
¯K 
¯W 
) ] 
× 
[ 
kiF
i 
K 
] 
⎡ ⎤ 
Exercise-weight elasticity 
[ 
∂W 
∂E 
E 
W 
] ⎢ ⎣ − ¯K(METE) ( ∑A 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
)2 
( 
¯E 
¯ W 
) ⎥ ⎦ 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 Table 2 
Price and income elasticities 
Goods Cereal and Meats Dairy Fruit and Other food Food away Non-food Income 
bakery vegetables (home) from home 
Cereal and bakery −0.606 0.036 −0.396 0.399 −0.673 0.182 −0.293 1.351 
Meats 0.014 −0.605 0.257 −0.072 0.180 −0.736 −0.849 1.810 
Dairy −0.547 0.589 −0.861 −0.143 −1.260 1.321 −1.346 2.246 
Fruit and vegetables 0.357 −0.108 −0.089 −0.979 −0.237 0.497 −1.042 1.601 
Other food (home) −0.337 0.176 −0.461 −0.125 −0.741 0.656 −0.207 1.038 
Food away from home 0.049 −0.337 −0.276 0.154 0.344 −0.692 1.173 1.379 
Non-Food 0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.008 −0.003 −0.045 −0.864 0.924 
Source: Reed et al. (2005). 
in the case of the high-calorie food tax (5). Table 1 gives an overview of the elasticity formulas 
and the energy accounting formulas. 
5.2. Empirical examples of the weight impact from a 10% high-calorie food tax 
5.2.1. Example 1: 10% high-calorie food tax on food away from home 
To illustrate how the elasticity equations can be used to determine price effects on weight, 
we consider the important question of whether discouraging away-from-home food consumption 
can lead to a weight reduction. Several studies suggest a link between obesity and eating away 
from home. The average American eats out four to ﬁve times per week and spends about 45% of 
their food dollars away from home (Binkley et al., 2000; Jeffery and French, 1998).6 The typical 
away-from-home meal is less healthy than home-cooked food, since it is more calorie-dense and 
contains more total fat, more saturated fat, less calcium, ﬁber, iron and fewer servings of fruits 
and vegetables (Chou et al., 2004; Lin and Fraz˜ ao, 1997). Lin and Fraz˜ao, 1999; Lin and Fraz˜ ao 
(1999) determined that 34% of the total daily calories are contributed from food away from 
home. In addition, several studies suggest that due to the ‘super-sizing’ trend which has swept 
the restaurant industry, when Americans eat out, they eat more (e.g. Young and Nestle, 2002). 
Thus, a rising away-from-home consumption appears to establish a signiﬁcant barrier to improve
American dietary habits and health status (Lin and Fraza˜o, 1999). Interestingly, independent of 
income class, U.S. households allocate the same percentage of expenditures on eating away from 
home (Atkinson, 2005). 
In order to utilize Eq. (5) and form the price-weight elasticities, it is necessary to collect price, 
weight, height and exercise information. The price elasticities are drawn from previous literature. 
Table 2 shows the food price elasticities used in this analysis which are taken from Reed et al. 
(2005). The elasticities are based on weighted sums of quarterly household expenditures reported 
in the diary section of the Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of 
6 The deﬁnitions for food away from home and food at home are based on the location where the foods are obtained 
and independent from where they are eaten. Foods purchased at retail stores, such as the grocery store or supermarket is 
classiﬁed as food at home. Foods away from home are obtained from foodservice and entertainment establishments, which 
are “restaurants,” or places with waiter service; “fast food,” those self-service and carry-out eating places and cafeterias; 
“schools,” including daycare centers and summer camps; and “others,” which include vending machines, community 
feeding programs, and someone else’s home. Meals and snacks that consist of a mixture of both away-from-home and 
home foods are classiﬁed according to the component that contributes the most calories to that particular eating occasion 
(Lin and Fraza˜o, 1999). 
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Labor. Overall, fruit and vegetables are the most price elastic, while meats are the most inelastic. 
Food away from home is a gross substitute for the at-home food groups, except for meats. Non­
food is a gross complement for all at-home groups (Reed et al., 2005). The own-price elasticity 
of food away from home and the cross-price elasticities between food away from home and the 
other foods consumed are used with the calculated food-weight elasticities to determine the ﬁnal 
weight impact. As exercise price elasticity, the cross-price elasticity between food away from 
home and non-food is used (Reed et al., 2005). 
In addition to collecting the price elasticities, it is also necessary to calculate weight elasticities 
using energy accounting shown in the previous section. Height, weight and BMI data for an 
adult average man and an adult average woman is taken from the 1963–1965 National Health 
Examination Survey (NHES) and the 1999–2002 National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey (NHANES) (Ogden et al., 2004). NHANES provides nationally representative information 
on the health and nutritional status of the U.S. population, and it is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services-National Center for Health Statistics (CDC, 2004a; 
USDHHS-NCHS, 2002). Table 3 shows the trends in body weight, height, BMI, and number of 
hours per day spent on exercise for U.S. adults for the time periods 1963–1965 and 1999–2000. 
The average height, weight, and BMI data is drawn from NHES and NHANES (Ogden et al., 
2004). The exercise time E is calculated using the National Time Use Studies and the Compendium 
of Physical Activities (Ainsworth et al., 1993; WebUse, 2003). Table 3 underlines the fact that 
both men and women gained on average about 10–12 kg (22–27 lbs) since 1963. 
Assuming the individual is in steady-state, the calorie-weight elasticity is 1 as shown in the 
previous section. To see this for an average man in 1999–2002, the ﬁgures in Table 3 can be 
substituted into Eq. (27) where K = 4366.51 kcal and W = 86.8 kg: 
1 K 1 4366.51 
εWK = ∑	 = = 1 (32)A	 W 50.305 86.8 
a=1(METa)(timea) 
In order to form the food-weight elasticities, the calorie-weight elasticity needs to be multiplied 
by the respective food-calorie elasticities. As shown in the previous section, this is accomplished 
by simply calculating the food type’s share of total daily calories consumed. Thus, it is necessary 
to have information about the average amount of calories contributed by eating particular foods. 
Table 3 
Trends in body weight, height, BMI and exercise time for U.S. adults (age 20–74 years), 1963–1965 vs. 1999–2002 
Gender 	1963–1965 1999–2002 
Male 	 Weight in kilograms (lbs) 
Height in meters (inches) 
BMI = kg/m2 
Exercise E (h/day) 
TEE in kcal 
Female 	 Weight in kilograms (lbs) 
Height in meters (inches) 
BMI = kg/m2 
Exercise E (h/day) 
TEE in kcal 
U.S. average 	 TEE in kcal 
75.60 (166.32) 
1.73 (68.30) 
25.26 
0.45 
3758.21 
63.70 (140.14) 
1.60 (63.10) 
24.88 
0.45 
3166.641 
NA
86.80 (190.96) 
1.76 (69.40) 
28.02 
0.57 
4366.51 
74.70 (164.34) 
1.62 (64.00) 
28.46 
0.57 
3757.81 
3900 
Sources: Weight and height data from Ogden et al. (2004). Calculation of BMI, TEE: author’s calculations based on WHO 
(1985), exercise expenditure: author’s calculations, based on Robinson and Godbey (1997), WebUse (2003). 
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Table 4 
Average daily per-capita consumption and calorie contribution of food types 
Food type Male Female 
Fi Per-capita ki Calorie Fi Per-capita ki Calorie 
consumption in contribution in consumption in contribution in 
pounds kcal pounds kcal 
Cereal and bakery 0.395 761.116 0.340 655.016 
Meats: beef: pork, poultry, ﬁsh, seafood 0.399 406.421 0.343 349.766 
Dairy: ﬂuid, butter, cheese, frozen and 0.574 258.632 0.494 222.578 
dry dairy products 
Fruit and vegetables: fresh and processed 1.422 221.684 1.224 190.781 
Other food (home): sugar and sweets, 0.552 1234.043 0.475 1062.016 
fats and oils, nonalcoholic beverages, 
eggs, miscellaneous foods 
Food away from home 1.722 1484.613 1.482 1277.657 
Sources: Author’s calculations, based on ERS/USDA (2004a, 2004b), Lin and Fraza˜o (1999). 
We use average U.S. data on daily per-capita food consumption (USDA, 2004a). Table 4 shows 
the average daily per-capita consumption and average daily calorie contribution of the food groups 
shown in of Table 2 (ERS/USDA, 2004a, 2004b). Since, on average, 34% of the total daily calorie 
consumption is contributed by food away from home (Lin et al., 1999), this implies that the high-
calorie food-weight elasticity in this case is 0.34. The consumption of all foods consumed at home 
is proportionally adjusted to contribute the remaining 66% of total daily caloric consumption. 
Each food type’s share of total daily caloric consumption represents the food type’s food-weight 
elasticity. 
In order to calculate the exercise-weight elasticity, several sources of data are required. In order 
to calculate TEE, information on the daily time usage and the associated METa is necessary. 
The National Time Use Study is a nationwide physical activities questionnaire that provides 
information on the average daily time usage for U.S. adults (Robinson and Godbey, 1997; WebUse, 
2003). Respondents participating in the National Time Use Studies have to report all daily activities 
and their duration in a diary. Overall, the report lists 99 different activities with the associated 
average number of minutes spent on it. Each activity recorded in the National Time Use Studies is 
associated with an activity code that allows a match between the activity and its energy expenditure 
METa (WebUse, 2003). In order to assign METs to each physical activities recorded in the National 
Time Use Studies, the Compendium of Physical Activities is used. The Compendium of Physical 
Activities standardizes the assignment of MET intensities in physical activity questionnaires 
(Ainsworth et al., 1993). Table 5 shows the daily time use in hours with their associated METa for 
2001. Since the daily time use is disaggregated into 99 different activities, 10 time use categories 
are formed that aggregate related activities, e.g., recreation/exercise. 
The exercise-weight elasticity (∂W/∂E)(E/W) shows the percentage change in weight after a 
1% increase in exercise E, evaluated at the mean levels of E and W is 
¯ 
εWE = ( ) =  × = −0.062 (33) −K¯ (METexercise) E −4366.51 × 3.11 0.571 ∑A 2 W¯ 2530.633 86.8 
1(METa)(timea)a= 
In order to quantify the weight impact of a tax on food away-from-home consumption, the 
appropriate price elasticities are used along with the weight elasticities as derived above. The 
Table 5 
Daily time use in hours for U.S. Adults (Age 18–64) in 1965 and 2001 
Time use category Hours per day Weighted average METa 
1965 2001 Initial data 
Paid work 4.83 5.16 1.56 
Household work 2.43 1.82 2.69 
Child care 0.58 0.67 3.18 
Obtaining goods and services 0.85 0.89 2.12 
Personal needs and care 10.37 10.31 2.46 
Education and training 0.2 0.59 1.08 
Organizational activities 0.33 0.29 1.57 
Entertainment/social 1.3 1.13 1.90 
Recreation/exercise 0.45 0.56 3.11 
Communication 2.65 2.59 1.17 
Sum per day 24 24 
Sources: Author’s calculations, based on Cutler et al. (2003) and Shapiro (2005). Time Use Data from Robinson and 
Godbey (1997), National Time Use Studies (WebUse, 2003). MET data from Ainsworth et al. (1993). Due to rounding 
errors, the sum of the individual numbers may slightly vary from the displayed total. 
food-weight and exercise-weight elasticities after a 1% consumption change in each good and a 
1% increase in exercise are shown in Table 6. 
Recall that the price-weight elasticity εWp
F H 
from Eq. (5) 
εWp
F H 
= εWF H εHH + εWF L εLH + εWEεEH 
and substituting the appropriate data yields 
εWp
F H 
= [−0.692 × 0.340] + [(0.656 × 0.283) + (0.497 × 0.051) + (1.321 × 0.059) 
+ (−0.736 × 0.093) + (0.182 × 0.0.174)] + [−0.045 × −0.062] 
= 0.0196 (34) 
This means that increasing the price of food away from home by 1% increases the body weight 
of an average male by 0.0196%. Since the administrative cost of implementing a 1% tax would 
probably outweigh its beneﬁts, this study focuses on policy changes in the size of 10% and thus, 
Table 6 
Food-weight and exercise-weight elasticities after a 1% change in the consumption of each good and exercise 
Category Elasticity 
Food-weight elasticity 
Cereal and bakery 0.174 
Meats 0.093 
Dairy 0.059 
Fruit and vegetables 0.051 
Other food 0.283 
Food away from home 0.340 
Exercise-weight elasticity −0.062 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
( ) ∑ ( ) 
the price-weight elasticity is scaled by the factor of 10. A 10% tax on food away from home 
would increase the body weight of an average male by 0.196%. For an average male, who weighs 
86.80 kg (190.96 lbs); this is a 0.00196 × 86.80 = 0.170 kg (0.374 lbs) weight gain. For an average 
female, a 10% increase in the price of food away from home is projected to increase body weight 
by 0.146 kg (0.322 lbs). Given that the body weight of an average female is lower than the weight 
of an average male, the weight increase for women is lower than the weight increase for men. For 
a 74.70 kg (164.34 lbs) woman, this translates to a ﬁnal weight of 74.846 kg (164.66 lbs). 
At ﬁrst, these results appear counter-intuitive. However, a tax on food away from home does in 
fact decrease away-from-home food consumption, but it increases at home food consumption due 
to the fact that the two categories are substitutes. Because many of the foods consumed at home 
are energy-rich, total calorie consumption actually increases. This ﬁnding is consistent previous 
literature (Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005; Darmon et al., 2002; Smith and Tasnadi, in press).´ 
Consumers may be implicitly solving a nutritional linear programming problem in which calories 
are but one of many required nutrients. If a reduction in the intake of food away from home leads 
to a reduction in some other necessary nutrients, compensatory purchases might well result in an 
increase in calorie intake, and thus, a weight increase. 
Additionally, the theoretical analysis of the earlier part of this paper aids in the understanding 
of the results. Using Eq. (11), the following needs to hold 
N 2.55i=5εWFLi εLiH + εWEεEH− = −  = −7.5 > εHH (35)
εWF H 0.34 
Using the price elasticity for food away from home of −0.692 (Table 2), a smaller value exists 
on the left hand side than on the right hand side, and thus, the inequality does not hold. This result 
is driven by the magnitudes and signs of the price elasticities. Table 2 shows that only meats are 
complements for food away from home, while all other goods are substitutes. Thus, given the 
10% tax on food away from home, meat consumption would decrease, while the consumption of 
all other goods would increase. As the empirical analysis showed, this increase would overall be 
larger than the decrease in the consumption of food away from home and thus, would lead to a 
weight gain. 
5.2.2. Example 2: 10% high-calorie food tax on soft drinks 
It is instructive to consider another example, in this case the effect of a high-calorie tax applied 
to soft drinks. Several studies suggest that the increased consumption of sugar-sweetened soft 
drinks are main culprits for the sharp rise in energy intake (Apovian, 2004; Hitti, 2004; Ludwig 
et al., 2001; Nielsen and Popkin, 2004; Harnack et al., 1999). One example of such a tax would 
be a 10% tax on caloric soft drinks, while diet soft drinks would remain untaxed. The price 
elasticities for the soft drinks are drawn from Dhar et al. (2003) and are displayed in Table 7. 
The elasticities are based on quarterly scanner data of supermarket sales. The table shows own-
and cross-price elasticities for 16 different soft drinks, where seven are diet soft drinks and nine 
are caloric soft drinks. Thus, the diet soft drinks remain untaxed, while the regular soft drinks are 
taxed. The cross-price elasticity between non-food and other foods is used as the food-exercise 
cross-price elasticity (Reed et al., 2005). 
In order to calculate the food-weight elasticities, the daily per-capita consumption of caloric 
soft drinks is used with its according calorie contribution. In 1999–2002, the average per-capita 
Table 7 
Soft drink price elasticities 
Goods Diet Diet Diet Diet Diet Dr. Diet Private Diet Regular Regular Reg. Dr. Reg. Mt. Reg. Reg. RC Reg. Reg. Private Reg. All 
Pepsi Coke 7-Up Sprite Pepper Label All-Other 7-Up Coke Pepper Dew Pepsi Cola Sprite Label Other 
Diet Pepsi −3.20 0.62 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.10 −1.05 0.32 1.42 0.51 0.19 −1.63 0.34 0.60 0.13 0.09 
Diet Coke 0.43 −2.88 0.04 0.12 0.11 −0.02 −1.44 0.24 0.31 0.16 −0.04 1.60 0.55 0.11 0.61 −0.67 
Diet 7-Up 0.60 0.27 −1.13 −0.08 −0.11 −0.05 0.01 −0.17 0.73 −0.34 0.09 −0.04 −0.58 −0.01 −0.17 0.25 
Diet Sprite 1.75 1.40 −0.13 −1.84 −0.20 −0.66 4.25 −0.62 −0.60 −0.58 −1.77 −0.18 −0.31 −1.45 0.22 −0.23 
Diet Dr. Pepper 1.20 1.39 −0.21 −0.23 −1.46 0.10 0.77 −0.35 1.55 −1.41 −0.59 −0.34 −0.82 −0.49 −1.52 −0.91 
Diet Private Label 1.04 −0.26 −0.11 −0.83 0.12 −2.29 2.50 −0.28 1.85 1.14 −1.39 −0.95 −0.34 −1.07 1.79 −1.39 
Diet All-Other −0.21 −0.47 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.05 −2.89 0.32 0.95 0.14 −0.12 0.78 −0.23 0.24 0.26 0.15 
Regular 7-Up 0.92 1.03 −0.11 −0.23 −0.11 −0.08 4.25 −1.95 −1.52 −0.70 0.82 −2.02 0.20 −0.30 −0.78 −0.20 
Regular Coke 0.74 0.20 0.08 −0.04 0.10 0.10 2.27 −0.30 −5.60 0.31 0.58 0.45 0.13 −0.31 0.01 0.05 
Reg. Dr. Pepper 1.68 0.82 −0.24 −0.24 −0.52 0.38 2.23 −0.78 1.99 −4.56 −1.13 0.36 0.76 −0.33 −1.56 0.81 
Reg. Mt. Dew 0.76 −0.27 0.08 −0.95 −0.28 −0.60 −2.44 1.18 4.49 −1.46 −7.66 5.82 0.54 −2.01 1.74 −0.12 
Reg. Pepsi −0.95 1.35 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 2.03 −0.42 0.49 0.05 0.82 −4.32 0.14 0.24 −0.67 0.18 
Reg. RC Cola 2.55 6.12 −0.95 −0.30 −0.71 −0.26 −7.95 0.54 1.93 1.75 0.99 1.88 −11.63 0.25 −0.53 5.61 
Reg. Sprite 1.95 0.47 −0.02 −0.63 −0.19 −0.38 3.52 −0.38 −1.96 −0.36 −1.63 1.34 0.10 −2.59 −0.13 −0.69 
Reg. Private Label 0.17 1.45 −0.08 0.04 −0.31 0.31 1.80 −0.50 −0.02 −0.87 0.72 −2.05 −0.13 −0.07 −2.90 0.62 
Reg. All-Other 0.07 −0.60 0.03 −0.02 0.07 −0.09 0.43 −0.04 0.10 0.14 −0.01 0.21 0.44 −0.11 0.25 −1.72 
Source: Dhar et al. (2003). 
Table 8 
Average daily per-capita consumption and calorie contribution of caloric soft drinks 
Food type Male Female 
Per-capita consumption 
in ﬂuid ounces 
Calorie contribution 
in kcal 
Per-capita consumption 
in ﬂuid ounces 
Calorie contribution 
in kcal 
Caloric soft drinks 14.125 171.339 12.156 147.454 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
soft drink consumption per day was 12.616 ﬂuid ounces per day, which equals a calorie intake of 
153.033 kcal (ERS/USDA, 2004a). The per-capita consumptions for the average male and female 
considered in this study are adjusted proportionally given that TEE = K=  3900 kcal of an average 
U.S. adult. Table 8 shows the daily average per-capita consumption and the associated calorie 
contribution from caloric soft drink consumption. 
The food-weight elasticity after a 1% increase in the consumption of caloric soft drinks is 
0.039 for male and for female respondents, respectively. Given that diet soft drinks do not contain 
any calories, the change in the according food-weight elasticities are zero. 
The 10% tax on caloric soft drinks applies to multiple goods and thus, Eq. (9) is used to 
calculate the price-weight elasticity. Using the price elasticities and food-weight elasticities, the 
price-weight elasticity is −0.099 for males and −0.122 for females. Thus, a 10% tax on regular 
soft drinks leads to a weight loss of 0.099% or 0.086 kg (0.189 lbs) for an average man and to 
a weight loss of 0.122% or 0.091 kg (0.201 lbs) for an average woman, respectively. Given that 
the magnitude of the price-weight elasticity for females is larger than the size of the price-weight 
elasticity for males, the calculated weight loss for females is higher as well. This is an interesting 
ﬁnding, given that evidence suggests that women have been more impacted by the increase in 
obesity than men (e.g., Cutler et al., 2003). Given the limited alternatives considered in this study, 
a 10% tax on high-calorie soft drinks proves to be relatively more efﬁcient for males and females. 
5.3. Empirical examples of the weight impact from a 10% low-calorie food subsidy 
5.3.1. Example 1: 10% low-calorie food subsidy on fruit and vegetables 
Using energy accounting, as well as price elasticities from Reed et al. (2005) allows for a 
quantiﬁcation of the weight impact of a 10% subsidy on fruit and vegetable prices. The food-weight 
elasticities are shown in Table 6. Thus, calculating the price-weight elasticity leads to εWp
F L 
= 
0.222, which means that a 10% subsidy on fruit/vegetables would lead to a weight increase of 
0.222% or 0.193 kg (0.425 lbs) for an average male. Calculating the appropriate elasticities for an 
average woman and using the same price elasticities leads to εWp
F L 
= 0.222. Thus, imposing a 
10% subsidy on fruit and vegetables would lead to a weight impact of 0.222% and a weight increase 
of 0.166 kg (0.365 lbs) for an average female.8 In light of the limited alternatives considered in 
this study, a 10% subsidy on low-calorie soft drinks proves to be relatively inefﬁcient for males 
and females. 
5.3.2. Example 2: 10% low-calorie subsidy on diet soft drinks 
Applying a 10% subsidy on diet soft drinks (see Table 9) leads to similar weight impacts as 
the tax on caloric soft drinks. The price-weight elasticity is −0.071 for an average male and an 
8 Conﬁdence intervals for these weight changes cannot be provided, because standard errors exist neither for the price 
elasticities nor the food-weight elasticities. 
Table 9 
Weight and BMI impacts from a 10% high-calorie food tax, a 10% low-calorie food subsidy and 10% income changes 
(where εWE �= 0) 
Market instrument Weight impact in % Change in weight in kg (lbs) BMI after intervention 
10% High-calorie food tax 
Male 
Tax: food away from home +0.196 +0.170 (+0.374) 28.077 
Tax: caloric soft drinks, −0.099 −0.086 (−0.189) 27.994 
Other goods: diet soft 
drinks 
Female 
Tax: food away from home +0.196 +0.146 (+0.322) 28.519 
Tax: caloric soft drinks, −0.122 −0.091 (−0.201) 28.429 
Other goods: diet soft 
drinks 
10% Low-calorie food subsidy 
Male 
Subsidy: fruit/vegetables +0.222 +0.193 (+0.425) 28.084 
Subsidy: diet soft drinks, −0.071 −0.061 (−0.135) 28.002 
Other goods: caloric soft 
drinks 
Female 
Subsidy: fruit/vegetables +0.222 +0.166 (+0.365) 28.527 
Subsidy: diet soft drinks, −0.071 −0.053 (+0.116) 28.444 
Other goods: caloric soft 
drinks 
10% Increase in income 
Male 
Income change +13.233 +11.486 (+25.269) 31.730 
Female 
Income change +13.233 +9.885 (+21.747) 32.230 
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: The base body weight of an average male (female) is 86.80 kg or 190.96 lbs (74.7 kg 
or 164.34 lbs) and the base BMI of an average male (female) is 28.02 (28.464). 
average female. Thus, imposing a 10% subsidy on diet soft drinks leads to a weight impact of 
−0.071%. Given the average body weights of an average male and an average female, the weight 
changes would be −0.061 kg (0.135 lbs) and −0.053 kg (0.116 lbs), respectively.9 
5.4. Empirical example of the weight impact from 10% income changes 
Using energy accounting and income elasticities from Reed et al. (2005) (see Table 2), the 
income-weight impact by 10% income changes; i.e., income increases, can be calculated. The 
empirical results lead to a weight gain of 11.486 kg (25.269 lbs) for an average male and 9.885 kg 
(21.747 lbs) for an average female. In the theoretical derivations of the earlier section of this 
paper, it was shown that income changes do not lead to any weight reduction when consuming 
normal or luxury goods. Income changes may lead to a weight decrease if the foods consumed 
are inferior goods. Table 2 shows that most of the income elasticities have magnitudes greater 
9 Conﬁdence intervals for these weight changes cannot be provided, because standard errors are not available for either 
the price elasticities or the food-weight elasticities. 
 than 1, which means that the demand for the food goods rises more than proportionate to the 
change in income. The income elasticity for exercise is close to one. Reed et al. (2005) note 
that the income elasticities are relatively large, due to the broad deﬁnitions of the individual 
categories. 
Table 9 summarizes the weight impacts by 10% taxes on food away from home, and on caloric 
soft drinks, 10% subsidies on fruit/vegetables, and on diet soft drinks, and 10% income changes 
for the case εWE �= 0, while Table 10 displays the weight impacts for the case that εWE = 0.  In
general, the price-weight elasticity measures the percentage change in body weight resulting 
from a 10% price (income) change. The change in weight in kg is based on a change from 
the average body weight of an adult U.S. male, which is 86.8 kg (190.96 lbs), and the aver­
age body weight of an adult U.S. female, which is 74.7 kg (164.34 lbs) (Ogden et al., 2004). 
Tables 9 and 10 also shows how much the BMI changes after the 10% taxes, 10% subsidies, or the 
10% income change have been implemented. The base BMI is the average BMI of an adult U.S. 
male, which is 28.020, and the average BMI of an adult U.S. female, which is 28.464 (Ogden et 
al., 2004). 
Table 10 
Weight and BMI impacts from a 10% high-calorie food tax, a 10% low-calorie food subsidy and 10% income changes 
(where εWE = 0)  
Market instrument Weight impact in % Change in weight in kg (lbs) BMI after intervention 
10% High-calorie food tax 
Male 
Tax: food away from home +0.168 +0.146 (+0.321) 28.069 
Tax: caloric soft drinks, −0.087 −0.075 (−0.165) 27.997 
Other goods: diet soft 
drinks 
Female 
Tax: food away from home +0.168 +0.126 (+0.276) 28.511 
Tax: caloric soft drinks, −0.122 −0.091 (−0.201) 28.429 
Other goods: diet soft 
drinks 
10% Low-calorie food subsidy 
Male 
Subsidy: fruit/vegetables +0.217 +0.188 (+0.414) 28.083 
Subsidy: diet soft drinks, −0.071 −0.061 (−0.153) 28.002 
Other goods: Caloric soft 
drinks 
Female 
Subsidy: fruit/vegetables +0.217 +0.162 (+0.356) 28.525 
Subsidy: diet soft drinks, −0.071 −0.053 (−0.116) 28.444 
Other goods: caloric soft 
drinks 
10% Income change 
Male 
Income change 13.805 +11.983 (+26.363) 31.890 
Female 
Income change 13.805 +10.312 (+22.686) 32.393 
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: The base body weight of an average male (female) is 86.80 kg or 190.96 lbs (74.7 kg 
or 164.34 lbs) and the base BMI of an average male (female) is 28.02 (28.464). 
 Tables 9 and 10 show that the magnitudes of the food-related price-weight elasticities are 
larger when εWE �= 0, which means that the weight increases are larger. The soft drink price-
weight elasticities do not change, with the exception of a tax on caloric soft drinks for males, 
which has a larger absolute magnitude when εWE �= 0. The magnitudes of all elasticities differ 
only slightly between both cases, which may be due to the fact that the price elasticity for “all 
non-food goods” was used to represent the exercise price elasticity.10 
Given the limited alternatives considered in this study, the sensitivity analysis shows that a 
10% tax on caloric soft drinks would lead to the largest weight loss for both men and women. The 
least efﬁcient alternative would be the 10% income change, which in the case of εWE = 0 could 
lead to the highest weight gain. Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that the weight impacts of 
taxes or subsidies on beverages are smaller than the weight impacts of taxes or subsidies on food. 
For example, the absolute magnitude of the weight change of a 10% subsidy on diet soft drinks 
is only a third of the size of the weight change of a 10% subsidy on fruit and vegetables. A 10% 
subsidy on diet soft drinks may be too low to motivate consumers to substitute caloric soft drinks 
with diet soft drinks. In order to achieve higher weight losses, the magnitude of the subsidy may 
need to be larger. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This study utilizes a microeconomic framework to investigate the impact of three different 
price and income changes on body weight. The weight impact depends on the substitutability or 
complementarity of high-and low-calorie foods and the effect of changes in high- and low-calorie 
food consumption on weight. This study provides a general framework to determine the conditions 
under which the market interventions would decrease body weight. 
This study shows that when consumer demand is only characterized by two goods (a high- and 
low- calorie food) and the two goods are complements, a high-calorie food tax always leads to a 
weight decrease; however, the weight effect can be positive or negative in the case of substitutes. 
When comparing the efﬁciency of the high-calorie food tax versus a low-calorie food subsidy, 
substitutability and weak complementarity may lead to a higher weight impact of the high-calorie 
food tax. Income changes could lead to weight gains except in the case when all foods are inferior 
goods or εWE �= 0. 
Utilizing price and income data and energy accounting, the theoretical framework is applied to 
quantify the weight impacts by price and income changes. Given the limited set of alternative mar­
ket interventions considered, this framework shows that a relative efﬁcient intervention is to apply 
a tax on caloric soft drinks. A small subsidy on diet soft drinks would be less weight-decreasing 
than a tax on caloric soft drinks. The least efﬁcient alternatives are to apply a tax on food away 
from home, a subsidy on food at home, or income changes, because these market interventions 
could actually lead to an increase in body weight. In the case of income changes, this may par­
tially due to the relatively large magnitudes of the income elasticities of the respective goods. 
Most of the income elasticities have magnitudes of greater than 1, which means that the demand 
for the food goods rises more than proportionate to the change in income. However, evidence 
10 Unfortunately, there do not exist good measures on the cross-price elasticity between food prices and exercise. To
provide some feel for the effect of this parameter, we have chosen to represent it with the cross-price elasticity between 
food and non-food items, which may underestimate of the actual magnitudes. We believe the cases with εWE �= 0 to be  
more plausible, given that exercise is sure to directly affect weight. Clearly more research is needed to help identify the 
magnitude of the cross-price elasticity between food prices and exercise. 
indicates a marked increase in obesity in the past 20 years, a time period in which real incomes 
have substantially increased. This ﬁnding is consistent with the result in this study—incomes 
have risen and weight has risen. It is unlikely that income elasticities remain constant as income 
changes. In particular, for food it is likely that as income rises, the income elasticity will fall (for 
example, see a comparison of income elasticities across rich and poor countries at ERS/USDA, 
2003). This means that when income rises, weight will increase across all income groups, but at 
a faster rate for low-income individuals. Given that the analysis in this study does not incorporate 
demographic differences in price, income elasticities, would likely show such a result. These 
ﬁndings emphasize the need to employ economic modeling when developing public policy to 
reduce obesity. 
This study suggests that a tax on caloric soft drink will likely decrease body weights. This 
intervention may improve the U.S. diet and at the same time inﬂuence a wide range of demographic 
subgroups. This is consistent with the ﬁnding by Jacobson and Brownell (2000), who propose to 
levy taxes on foods of low nutritional value, such as caloric soft drinks. The American Medical 
Association (AMA) currently considers proposals that encourage taxes on soft drinks. The soft 
drink resolution would call on federal, state, and local government ofﬁcials to institute a small tax 
on caloric soft drinks. Diet soft drinks, ﬂavored milk, and fruit drinks are not going to be taxed. 
The proposal would also recommend that proceeds should be used for anti-obesity programs 
(Ritter, 2006). 
A high-calorie tax, while possibly efﬁcient, might be deemed equitable if combined with 
income redistribution to low-income households. Previous literature shows that an increase in 
incomes leads to a large expenditure increase on food away from home (e.g., Stewart et al., 
2004). Since food away from home is typically higher in calories and fat, this would result 
in weight gain. However, our results suggest that taxing food away from home could actually 
increase weight. These controversial results show that further research is needed to determine the 
interaction between income changes, food choices, and body weight. The model outlined in this 
paper provides a convenient approach to carry out this and other future analyses. 
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